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Abstract 
 
This article examines the external and organizational factors behind the coalition dynamics of 
two labour unions representing a different mix of employment contract types – temporary and 
permanent – that led the 2007 Irregular Workers Movement in South Korea. Drawing on semi-
structured interview, video, newspapers and internal document data, we find that while political 
opportunities drove the two unions to come together, broad alliances formed around the 
coalition on the issue of job security of irregular workers marginalized the union with 
predominantly regular workers. Organizational differences that seemed complementary at first 
hindered a collective identity from forming and became a source of resentment as strikes 
continued on. Varying progression of negotiations not only reduced the benefits of claims 
coordination and collective action but also invoked otherness among them. Lack of trust and 
recognition did not allow for even a loose cooperative differentiation relation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s, we have seen a significant increase in atypical employment (part-time, 
fixed-term, and temporary agency contracts) across European and Asian countries 
(Salvatori 2009) with growth of global value chains and increased pressure on 
employers to cut labor costs and to respond to demand fluctuation. (Doellgast, Lillie, 
and Pulignano 2018; Kalleberg 2003) The varying needs and membership 
characteristics have resulted in a complex relationship of cooperation and conflict 
among the workers of different employment contract types. (Lee and Frenkel 2004; Jin 
2012) Permanent or regular workers are in general better paid, enjoy better working 
conditions and are more likely to be unionized than the atypical or the irregular 
counterparts. Even when the existing permanent worker union pushes to recruit the 
irregulars for reasons of revitalization, (Heery and Adler 2004; Flecher and Hurd, 1998) 
protection from labour cost competition, or in pursuit of worker solidarity, equity and 
justice, (Doellgast, Lillie, and Pulignano 2018: p 1) there exist a fear that its relationship 
with the management, permanent workers’ job security and working conditions will 
deteriorate if it begins incorporating irregular worker issues (Cervino 1999; Cho 2009; 
Heery and Abbot 2000; Jin 2012). Since the alliance with regular workers is important 
for the improvement of the irregular workers’ rights (Cho 2009; Jang 2009; Jin 2012; 
Lee et. al. 2014; Yoon 2010) and exclusive strategies of unions that neglect the interest 
of precarious workers are rarely sustainable in the long run, (Doellgast, Lillie, and 
Pulignano 2018: 1) the conditions under which solidarity of different employment 
contract types emerge and weaken warrant a detailed examination. 
 This article presents a case study of the coalition dynamics of two South Korean 
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unions in representation of a different mix of employment contract types. In February 
2007, South Korean National Assembly passed an “Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-
term and Part-time Employees” (also known as the “Irregular1 Worker Protection Act”, 
hereafter the Act), which prohibited employers to hire fixed-term employees for a 
period more than two years. The law enacted to provide protection to the increasing2 
number of precarious workers aroused much opposition from labour: rather than 
guaranteeing permanent status to those with more than two years of employment, the 
firms could fire the fixed-term employees or allow the contracts to lapse before the law 
was to go into effect on July 1 2007 and outsource the jobs to avoid responsibility over 
employment and effectively lower the wage. While some firms upgraded the contracts 
and others chose to lay off, a Group EL, a conglomerate then ranked the 26th in Korea 
in terms of corporate revenue, took an extreme measure and let go of more than 700 
irregular workers from its subsidiary retail companies H and N in April and May of 
2007. In response, their respective unions, the EGLU and the NLU, came together to 
protest against the mass dismissals. The coalition led the “E-N struggle”, which became 
the backbone of the 2007 Irregular Workers Movement as citizens, interest groups, 
enterprise unions, and pro-labour political parties joined in. 
The E-N struggle was framed as a case of exemplary solidarity building for the 
represented employment contract types of the respective unions.3 While more than half 
of the EGLU’s members were temporary, over 90% of the NLU’s members were 
permanent. Workers of both types had come together in demand for better job security 
and rights of the irregulars. (Yoon 2010; Young and Broadbent 2015) What was rarely 
discussed, however, was that in addition to the irregular work related claims that the 
EGLU was fighting for, the NLU was protesting against forced transfers of the 
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permanent workers that occurred concurrently: in order to lay off the irregulars, the firm 
went on to outsource the jobs, from which the permanent workers that were working 
with the irregulars were also reassigned. For the NLU the strike was against 
restructuring rather than one that solely focus on irregular workers. (Kwon 2008)  They 
recruited the irregulars only in April 2007. What was also mostly unknown about the 
coalition was that when the strikes came to an end, the two unions had long grown apart 
and the members tried to avoid protesting together. The “Joint Strike Headquarters” 
(hereafter Headquarters) consisting of representatives of the two unions as well as two 
umbrella organizations, the Korean Federation of Service Workers’ Unions (hereafter 
KFSWU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (hereafter KCTU), that was 
formed at the beginning of the strikes eventually became a venue for information 
exchange on logistics rather than strategy building and coordination: no meeting were 
held under the name after April 20084  and when the NLU reached an agreement with 
the management in August 2008, the EGLU only learned of it from the media.5 
Based on semi-structured interviews from fieldwork, daily newspaper articles, 
internal union documents and video footages, the article examines the organizational 
and external factors behind the coalition formation and dissolution, drawing from the 
social movement and the workplace politics literatures for a framework of analysis. 
While the latter help us understand the source of the factors that governed the relations 
of the two unions, the former guides us in identifying the mechanisms through which 
the factors affected the coalition. The article contributes to the work on movement 
decline, which often coincide with the dissolution of coalitions and is relatively 
unaddressed despite its importance. (Fillieule 2015)   
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The article argues that in addition to the uncooperative common parent firm and 
the shared experience of unilateral restructuring at the time of the passage of the Act,  
“exchange” and “division of labour” (Zald and McCarthy 1987: 164) drew the two 
unions closer. While the EGLU mostly consisted of irregular workers brought a 
politically salient cause, a membership supported by the public, and tactical spontaneity 
and aggressiveness, the NLU predominantly consisted of permanent workers brought 
structure, bargaining power, and finances. The differences in organization, membership 
and goals, however, hindered a collective identity from forming and became a source 
of resentment as strikes continued. Varying progressions of negotiations led to 
diverging optimal strategies, not only reducing the benefits of claims coordination and 
collective action but also invoking otherness among the members. Broad alliances 
around irregular work related claims that initially empowered the E-N struggle ended 
up marginalizing the NLU and the seeming lack of commitment of the NLU 
disappointed the EGLU. Mutual resentment did not even allow for “cooperative 
differentiation” (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Staggenborg 1986). 
What first follows is the analytic framework and descriptions of the data, 
research methodology, and limitations. Analyses of coalition formation and dissolution, 
and discussions on the impact of the coalition dynamics on the outcome of the strikes 
as well as what could have sustained the solidarity follow.  
 
 
2. Analytic framework 
 
When do distinct actors form a coalition and create a “new, visible, and direct 
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coordination of claims” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 216) and when do they decide to go 
on separate paths?  The case introduced in the article is of a coalition of two trade unions 
representing a different mix of employment contract types leading an irregular workers 
movement against a newly introduced labor law devised to enhance irregular workers 
job security. Thus, the structural factors such as political opportunities, availability of 
resources, managements’ responses as well as organizational factors such as the 
membership, claims, and the workplace politics of irregular workers and the permanent 
workers that influence the construction of collective identity are starting points for 
investigation. Existing research argues that political or environmental opportunities and 
new threats to organizations’ goals and commonalities in interests and ideology which 
can serve as a basis for a mutually acceptable coalition frame are conducive to coalition 
formation (Croteau and Hicks 2003; Levy and Murphy 2006; McCammon and Cambell 
2002; Mayer and Brown 2005; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Meyer and Whittier 
1994; Staggenborg 1986; Van Dyke 2003). Some find that coalitions are more likely to 
be formed during a period of resource abundance (Staggenborg 1986; Van Dyke 2003; 
Zald and McCarthy 1987), while others show the opposite (McCammon and Campbell 
2002).  
Since all the participants have to agree to form a coalition, decision of each 
counts. From a rational choice perspective, it would join forces with others when the 
expected benefits exceed the expected costs (Levy and Murphy 2006; Zald and Ash 
1986), both of which are derived from the multiplicity and diversity of actors involved. 
Through increased number of participants and broader coverage of individual 
characteristics, not only can a coalition give better justification of the goals being 
pursued and draw more financial and political support (McCammon and Campbell 2002; 
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Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Tarrow 1994), organizations can exert greater pressure on 
the target. (Van Dyke 2003) Resources, political opportunities, leadership, and tactics 
spill over. For a resource-deprived organization, an alliance with a more established 
partner can ease its financial distress. When claims of an organization gain salience, 
others can free ride on the endorsement either by framing their issues in similar terms 
and building a “consonant frame pyramid” (Croteau and Hicks 2003; Meyer and 
Corrigall-Brown 2005) or by forming an alliance so to be identified with the group. The 
modularity of tactics (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 23) leads to division of labour (Zald and 
McCarthy 1987: 170) and allows organizations an expanded toolbox to work from at 
various stages of the claims-making process. By forming a coalition, unnecessary 
competition among organizations to attract financial resources and mass support (Zald 
and McCarthy 1987: 170; Tarrow 1989: 186) can be saved. There are, however, direct 
costs involved. When a coalition is formed, the original goals of each organization may 
be marginalized and they may face new opposition because of their partners (Hula 1995; 
McCammon and Campbell 2002). When the size of a coalition becomes too big, 
maintenance can be costly (Staggenborg 1986).  
Costs and benefits are not stationary: the environment and objectives of the 
organizations change over time. It can be optimal to form and break alliances depending 
on which stage they are at in the claims-making process. In case of trade unions, during 
the pre-negotiation stage, their immediate interest is getting to the negotiation table. At 
this stage, because of the sharing of costs, increased justification, and power in 
collective action, alliances may emerge. Once negotiations begin, however, progression 
will likely vary depending on the respective claims and the receptiveness of the 
management. The optimal responses could differ and coordination of claims and 
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collective action may not worth the effort any more.  
Shared identities or absence of significant differences in identity can help the 
coalition formation process (Van Dyke 2003; Daini and Bison 2004) and are necessary 
for a sustained partnership (Hathaway and Meyer 1997). Smith (2002) argues that 
frequent interaction, collective action and public sharing of risks or costs among 
activists can build trust and promote group identities (507, 508). For workers of 
different employment contract types, similarity of jobs, compensation and demographic 
characteristics such as age and sex can also strengthen collective identity. (Jang 2009; 
Lee et al. 2014; Yoon 2010) If the organizational and membership differences become 
more prominent to the members during collective activities because the risk or cost 
sharing is unequal, however, collective identity may be difficult to be constructed.   
Collective identity can invoke “class rationality” or the pursuit of interests of 
the labor class as a whole, which is weighed against the pursuit of worker’s own 
interests or “individual rationality” (Cho 2009), though the two may be aligned and no 
conflict arises. Having greater job security, better working conditions and greater 
bargaining power, it is usually the regular workers and the ideology and determination 
of the leadership of the regular worker union that determine the relation with their 
irregular counterparts. (Jang 2009) When economic strains intensify and the 
collaboration start to hurt one’s financial interests, individual rationality prevails and 
the alliance can be undermined. (Yoon 2010) Varying degrees of receptiveness of the 
managements towards the unions may weaken class rationality if it succeeds in 
instilling “otherness.” 
In summary, though expected payoffs of spillovers of political opportunities, 
management response and resources can bring organizations together, the structural 
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factors change over time and it could be optimal for organizations to go on separate 
paths. Broad alliances surrounding the coalition can marginalize individual 
organization’s members and goals and invoke resentment. The varying progression of 
negotiations can not only lead to different optimal responses but also hamper collective 
identities from being constructed. Frequent interactions can also be an occasion for 
individuals to realize the otherness between them. Lack of a collective identity can 
contribute to weakening of class rationality, which can lead to coalition dissolution if 
individual rationality prevails over it.   
 
3. DATA and METHODS 
 
The article draws from three major sources: the first is semistructured 
qualitative interview from the fieldwork that was conducted with the two unions in 
Seoul, South Korea from May 2008 to June 2008 and subsequent interviews conducted 
from July 2018 to October 2018. During the fieldwork, I participated in the biweekly 
protests of the both unions and observed the meetings with permission. In total, I have 
interviewed 16 individuals and held unstructured group talks with members from both 
unions at protest sites. I interviewed seven people from the leadership of the two unions, 
three of them twice, in 2008 and 2018. Individuals who actively collaborated with the 
coalition over the entirety of the strike were interviewed as well: they were three staff 
members from the KFSWU, two staff members from the KCTU, one labour organizer 
from the Democratic Labour Party, a certified labour attorney, a documentary film 
maker, and a journalist from a newspaper specializing in labour. Interviews in general 
lasted for 90-120 minutes. The content of the meetings and interviews were written 
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close to word-for-word in notebooks and was later transcribed on computer. 
The second source of data is 2612 newspaper articles from the Korean 
Integrated News and Database System covering 44 major daily newspaper corporations 
from January 2006 to December 2008 regarding the two unions. After downloading the 
articles, I used the program package R for analysis.  
 The third source of data is video footages from May 2007-October 2007 on the 
sites of both unions’ sit-down strikes. A documentary filmmaker Mirae Kim was 
filming union meetings as well as almost all of the official strikes held, capturing the 
interactions of union members, leadership, and outside collaborators. Interviews were 
included as well. I was granted access to all the video footages that amounted to 308 
60-minute tapes. In addition, I was granted access to the daily protest activity log and 
miscellaneous internal documents of the two unions. 
 The work in essence employs a mix-methods approach. The article uses 
both grounded theory to process interview, documentary as well as film data and 
statistical analysis of newspaper articles to strengthen the claims. Though there is 
limitation in generalizing the conclusions as it is a case study, the work can be a basis 
for further empirical research on coalition within social movements, trade union 
dynamics and workplace politics. 
 
 
4. Case study of two unions 
4.1 Coalition formation 
4.1.1 History of the unions 
Before discussing the 2007 coalition, we first trace the history of the two unions 
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and their brief interaction in 2006 - a loose alliance that was short-lived. In 2006, there 
were three labour representations based in the Group EL: the NLU, the ELU and the 
CLU. Founded in 1998, the NLU represented the workers from N, a department store-
turned-outlet bought by the Group EL in Dec 2003. Company N was a union shop of 
permanent workers from both the shop floor and in managerial positions, strong and 
well organized having had to live through grueling restructuring, default, and 
acquisition processes. In 2006, the NLU had more than 1300 members enjoyed a certain 
preferential treatment within the Group EL having one of its most profitable stores (GN). 
Though the ELU, the official labour union of the Group EL, was founded in 
1993, the management took four years to recognize it as a valid negotiation partner: 
only after fifty-seven days of striking in 1997 did they reach a collective bargaining 
agreement that guaranteed wage payment during leave. In 2000, after two-hundred sixty 
five days of striking, the first significant irregular workers’ struggle in the country, the 
working conditions of temporary workers improved. Despite the success, the strife left 
the organization with a mere fifty members at the end of 2001. 
The CLU was the labour union of 16 stores of a retail Company C that would 
be eventually acquired by the Group EL in June 2006 and become Company H. The 
workers’ fear of unemployment in the acquisition process had led to a sharp increase in 
membership in 2006. About twenty percent of the total workers were union members 
and more than half of them were temporaries, mostly female and in their thirties, forties, 
and fifties. The CLU had succeeded in reaching a collective agreement with the 
management of company C that specified the acquiring firm was to recognize the labour 
union and guarantee continued employment of all workers. It also included a clause that 
prohibited terminating the contracts of irregular workers of more than eighteen months.  
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 In May 2006, all three unions were striking against the Group EL. The NLU 
was in the middle of its annual wage negotiations and was protesting against the firm’s 
proposal of introducing a new wage system. Freedom of union activities was also a 
concern: the firm had recently called in over 900 union members for “disciplinary” 
purposes to dissuade them from participating in union activities. For the ELU, the firm’s 
circumvention, distortion, and finally a renege of the collective agreement, evasion of 
labor regulations and promotion disadvantages imposed on union members fueled the 
protests. The CLU was in the middle of acquisition turmoil and wanted the Group EL 
to guarantee that it would respect the collective agreement drawn with Company C.  
Faced with an uncooperative parent firm around the same time, the three unions 
formed a “Joint Strike Headquarters” to coordinate protests. On May 10 2006, a plan 
for a merger of three unions was declared. (Labor Today, 2006)  The coalition, however, 
was not a strong one: A union leader of EGLU reflected that the common headquarters 
in 2006 was of a top-down talk driven one pushed mainly by the leaders and had failed 
to involve their members.6 Collective protests were small in size and rare. The NLU 
reached an agreement in July 2006 and remained in the coalition in name only. There 
were few attempts of collective action afterwards by the ELU and the CLU with little 
success.7 In December 2006, the ELU and the CLU finally merged and formed the 
EGLU. The two were both weak and a formal merger was a way of pooling their 
resources and revitalizing the organization. On the other hand, the gap between the two 
unions and the NLU in membership characteristics especially the employment contract 
types and its status within the Group EL was too wide to overcome.8  
 
4.2. Coalition formation of 2007 
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The first union member temporary worker was fired on the 17th of April from H, and 
on the 2nd of May the N announced that it was going to outsource the cashier positions. 
In two months, more than 700 workers were laid off. The Headquarters announced a 
strategy of “collective struggle, collective negotiation, collective agreement,” 9  a 
conscious action to counter divide-and-rule strategies of the Group EL. Starting with a 
collective strike (10th of June), the NLU went on an “indefinite strike” (22nd of June), 
followed by the EGLU conducting an in-house picketing strike on the 30th of June, the 
day before the Act was to go into effect, with workers blocking entry and occupying 
one of the most profitable branches of H. The occupation strike lasted for fifteen 
consecutive days. The NLU soon joined in at its GN branch store on the 8th of July.  
The passage of the Act and the Group EL’s hostile attitude towards labour 
unions at its subsidiary firms provided an environment conducive for the unions to 
overcome the differences in their goals. In order to outsource cashier jobs in response 
to the Act, N introduced the personal digitized assistant system in December 2006 and 
let go or let the contracts to lapse of the temporary cashiers and at the same time 
forcefully transferred the permanent ones that worked together with the temporaries to 
other jobs. Though the NLU incorporated the issue of irregular work by newly 
recruiting temporary workers in February, the dispute over irregular contracts was of 
secondary concern since more than 90% of the union members were regular workers. 
The NLU framed the goal of the strike as a protest against “restructuring.” All the 
interviewees from the NLU emphasized that it was not a protest of irregular workers 
but of both the regular and irregular workers. On the other hand, EGLU’s claims were 
specifically on the job security of irregular workers. More than half of the union 
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members were irregular workers whose immediate concerns were employment 
guarantee and collective bargaining rights.  
In addition to the leverage in negotiations that committed collective action 
provided, protesting with the other had emotional benefits. Interviewed members often 
talked of feeling less threatened when they were demonstrating together while 
surrounded by the riot police and violent counter-protest mobs.10 The coalition also 
increased the strategic capacity (Ganz 2000; Murphy 2002) by resource spillovers and 
sharing ‘staff experience and relationships with authorities and allies.’ The NLU 
brought bargaining power and finances to the coalition. Respected as a model labour 
union in the KFSWU, the union had a history of standing strong against the 
management and the members had unquestioned trust towards the leadership.11 During 
the first days of collective strikes in June 2007, the NLU led the planning and execution 
of the protests. The relatively wealthy NLU had lent 5million Korean Won (US$4,000) 
at the beginning of the strikes and paid more than the EGLU for common expenses. 
The NLU leadership estimated that about 50 million Korean Won (US$40,000) in total 
transfers were made to the EGLU over the entire protest period.12 
The EGLU brought to the coalition an agenda of political salience as well as 
membership that garnered unprecedented public support. The activation of the 
nonregular protection act on 1st of July was an opening of a political opportunity. Being 
framed and actively framing themselves as “mothers in their 30s to 50s who earns 
approximately 800,000 Korean Won (US$640) a month (approximately $4.00 per hour), 
who sometimes had to work without a single break for six hours,” (Hankyoreh, 2007) 
protesters succeeded in drawing sympathy from the public that was hostile to labour 
strikes in general. Politicians talked about “returning our mothers to our homes.” The 
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NLU, mostly consisting of young, regular workers whose working conditions were 
significantly better, benefited from such framing of the demonstration as “a struggle for 
eliminating discrimination of irregular workers,” which was important in garnering 
external support to pressure the unrelenting firm. Citizens responded with boycotting 
the Group EL and, interest groups, enterprise unions, and pro-labour political parties 
joined in the strikes snowballing the E-N struggle to a nationwide Irregular workers 
movement. 
On July 10th, the management finally came out to the negotiation table for both 
unions. Unions continued to protest ‘to have leverage at the negotiation table.’13 The 
Korean Thanksgiving day (which fell on the third week of September in 2007) is one 
of the two biggest national holidays of the year, when the greatest proportion of revenue 
is reaped for retailers such as N and H. If protests ended before Thanksgiving, the firms 
could partially make up for the loss they have incurred, estimated at fifty to hundred 
million dollars from sit-down protests and boycotts during previous months. The 
government had the Annual Inspection of State Administration approaching in October 
and the presidential election in December. The Labour minister, who was open about 
wanting to run for the National Assembly the following year, pressured the 
management for more active negotiations. By now, the strikes evolved into a contention 
between the labour and the capital on the issue of temporary work, the former back by 
the KCTU and the latter by the Korea Employers Federation, the KCTU’s enterprise 
counterpart. The coalition was fighting on behalf of the “8,500,000 irregular 
workers.”14 The public was judging the government for the newly enacted Law. All the 
eyes and ears were on the negotiation table, since whatever the outcome, it was sending 
out a signal on how unions and firms could navigate the irregular protection Act. 
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4.3 Coalition Dissolution 
 
In the meantime, signs of tension between the two unions started to emerge.  
Though the members of the two unions frequently engaged in collective protests, a 
collective identity did not emerge easily. Differences of the two unions became more 
evident at the strike sites as well as during the negotiations. Each union was a relatively 
homogenous group in age, sex, marital and employment statuses. The NLU mainly 
consisted of young, regularly employed single female workers while the EGLU 
consisted of older, temporarily-employed married ones. Since the coalition’s main 
activity was protests where all the members physically sat side-by-side for long 
stretches of time, the lack of sense of unity or solidarity, the ‘we-ness,’ among members 
weakened the alliance. Cultural difference was apparent. The younger NLU women 
were more reserved and quieter. ‘Because they are young in their twenties, they will 
just come and sit there, re-do their make-up, watch TV, send text messages and play 
video games on their cellular phones.’15 While from the point of view of the NLU 
workers, ‘the EGLU women were too reckless not thinking about the consequences.’  
16 Differences in organizational resource levels displayed in the protest sites distressed 
the EGLU members as protests continued. An example that came up in multiple 
interviews was lunch and transportation. 17  ‘When the NLU members ate lunch boxes 
of 5,000 Korean Won (US $4.00) value, the EGLU members ate a simple sushi roll 
(kim-bob) of 1,000 Korean Won (US $0.80) value. This might not seem like a big deal 
but imagine this happening every day for three months. The NLU members took a 
rented bus to protest sites while the EGLU members had to take public transportation. 
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Mostly, the fact that NLU members were mostly regular workers when we were not ... 
The clear difference of status lessened our spirits.’ (Lee Kyung Ok, interview 26 July 
2018) 
Organizational differences meant varying goals, which determined the relative 
receptiveness of firms towards the two unions at the negotiation table. In September 
right before the thanksgiving holidays, the NLU talks progressed at a fast pace because 
the management was willing to compromise on the permanent worker issues. Table 1 
and 2 shows the claims of the two unions and responses of the firms. Reckoning that 
the firm was not willing to yield on the irregular worker issues, which was basically all 
of their claims, the EGLU cancelled the scheduled meeting to go on to another sit-down 
strike on the September 16th despite warnings from the firm and the government. The 
NLU, in the process of drafting its agreement with the firm, declined to join the EGLU. 
Multiple interviewees point to this period as the time when the coalition was seriously 
shaken.18 Though the unions had concurred that the negotiation was a separate process 
and that any organization that came to an agreement first should leave the strike site, 
there were pressures within as well as outside the coalition to coordinate the protests, 
negotiation and agreement. The understanding was now breached with the NLU 
choosing to negotiate while the EGLU chose to protest.  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
The NLU further retracted from the coalition as they realized that being a part 
of the coalition as well as the temporary workers movement was hampering the 
  
18 
progression of their negotiations. First, the coalition put the NLU on a weaker footing 
with the firm. KHJ, one of the leaders of the NLU reflected that the negotiation per se 
would have progressed more smoothly if the union had operated by itself. “We were a 
union of permanent workers, in any case. If we had ignored the EGLU’s (request to join 
forces) and had compromised with the firm, I think we could have ended up with a 
better agreement even on the temporary workers’ claims”19 Though it was true that the 
broader social alliance and presence of the major interest parties such as the KCTU led 
the firm to the negotiation table, they at the same time restricted the options of the firm 
and the union. An KCTU staff member that collaborated closely with the NLU, recalled 
that “the firm at first was not so adamant against the union when the negotiation began, 
but slowly became more so (influenced by the positions of the KEF).” 20  The 
management tried to play the media to appease the public rather than to talk to the union, 
holding press conferences on what they were willing to offer to the union before the 
actual negotiations, and presenting alternatives to the unions. 21 
Coordinating claims as well the tactics retrospectively seemed to have been 
unhelpful to the NLU as well.22 Even though the negotiations were agreed to be a 
separate process, the alignment of the claims of the two unions especially of the 
irregular work related ones were apparent during the first months as shown in Table 1 
and Table 2, which had restricted the NLU’s options in the negotiation processes. On 
the tactical front, the NLU was led into a sit-down strike by the EGLU, from which the 
raised charges haunted the organization for years to come without much positive 
outcome: the sit-down strike succeeded in drawing national attention to the coalition, 
but the NLU may not have needed it to get themselves to the negotiation table. 
Lack of recognition and representation also frustrated the members of the NLU.23 
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Though the organization’s foremost concern was the permanent workers’ forced 
transfers, it was rarely mentioned in the media. Table 3 show the number of articles that 
mention the NLU's key regular worker related claim, “forced transfers” out of all the 
articles from daily newspapers. During the period of January 2007 to August 2008, out 
of 2248 articles that covered both the NLU and EGLU, only 50 of them (2.22%) 
mentioned forced transfers. Even during July 2007 with most media coverage, it was 
only 14 out of 907 articles that mentioned the phrase.  Part of it was strategic. Though 
in the formal statements of the NLU included issues of restructuring and forced 
transfers, in order to advertise their strikes to the public, the union promoted the 
irregular workers issues.24 Though the members recognized that the regular workers’ 
forced transfers would not be solved without solving the irregular worker’s problem, 
the framing of their strike as “irregular workers struggle” “constantly haunted the 
leadership as well as the members.” 25  The issue frames to take advantage of the 
opening of the political opportunity structure in the end contributed in marginalizing 
the NLU’s objectives and naturally the members started to question why they were on 
strike. The EGLU members mentioned that the “meaning finding” through external 
solidarity building and media attention helped them think about the significance of their 
work and encouraged them to continue.26 The NLU on the other hand did not have much 
opportunity to “see their work in a larger context”  because their efforts and the role 
they were playing in the irregular workers’ movement was not paid much attention to. 
(Cole and Luna 2010: 85)  
 
<table 3 insert here> 
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The order of the names of the unions featured in newspaper articles was also a pointed 
issue. Originally named the “N-E” struggle in July, the strike was mainly referred to 
“E-N” struggle from August 2017 as we can see in the Picture 1.   
 
<Insert Picture 1 about here> 
 
The picture 2 compares the frequency that the leaders of each union was mentioned 
during the period of June and July. Comparing the week beginning on the July 9th when 
the EGLU and the NLU were both on occupation strike, KGW the leader of the EGLU,  
was mentioned twice as more than PYS, the leader of the NLU.  
 
<Insert Picture 2 about here> 
 
For the EGLU, the seeming lack of commitment inferred from the NLU’s 
reluctance in employing more aggressive tactics as well as the NLU’s shown 
willingness to negotiate with the firm generated resentment, which eventually led it to 
consider the NLU as unreliable. Difference in the organizational goal and situational 
differences led to different preferred tactics. A week before the planned sit-down strike 
on the day that the Act was to go on effect, the NLU leadership announced to the Joint 
Strike Headquarters that they were not going to join the EGLU: the NLU had not come 
to an internal agreement regarding the occupation strike. One of the leaders of the 
EGLU recalls it as a shock and a disappointment. When the sit-down strike of the EGLU 
became the focus of all media, the NLU started to feel pressure internally and 
externally,27 which in the end led them to follow suit eight days later. In October, when 
  
21 
KGW, then released from jail requested to come to its meeting to persuade the NLU 
members to participate in more active protests, it was declined for reasons of internal 
regulation. Throughout the strike, the NLU was embittered that the EGLU constantly 
demanded that the NLU do more.28  
  
“The NLU had never lost a fight. Did not have a long term striking experience. 
The NLU were mainly regular workers that had their employment contracts guaranteed, 
always trying to seek a way to leave the strike. … NLU fought because it was resentful 
towards the firm, we fought because we were desperate.”  (Gyung Wook Kim, 
interview) 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Despite active negotiations in September 2007, the NLU failed to come to an 
agreement in the end because its management was unwilling to meet the demands 
related to irregular workers and insisted on punishing the union leadership. For the 
EGLU, there was no negotiation proper: neither side relented from their original 
positions the few times the firm and the union actually got together. By the end of 
2007, the media and the public had lost interest, and protests once participated by over 
a thousand people shrank rapidly in size as strikers crossed the picket-line or moved 
on to other jobs. By June 2008, there were only fifty to sixty strikers at each union’s 
protests.  The NLU, after 434 days of strike, reached an agreement with the Group EL 
early September of 2008 with significantly worse terms than what could have been 
possible the year before. The NLU not only gave up on all clauses in order to avoid 
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legal charges (which surmounted to approximately 10 million US dollars) and the re-
employment of the regular workers that were on strike, the union agreed to giving up 
its rights to protest till the end of 2010. The 36 cashiers with lapsed contracts were 
rehired with brand-new contracts with no employment guarantee.  
In June 2008, the Group announced its plan to sell H (the EGLU’s base firm) to 
a SHT, another retailing conglomerate. The EGLU drew out a collective agreement 
with SHT in November 2008 after 510 days of strike. Unlike the Collective Agreement 
of the NLU and the Group EL, they agreed on directly employing temporary workers 
(i.e., no outsourcing) and increasing their wages as well as granting paid leaves. The 
union members that were fired because of the strike were also re-employed and the 
legal charges were settled. The labour union in turn withdrew its rights to protest till 
the end of 2010 and agreed upon delegating the wage increases to the firm for a certain 
period of time. The union representatives retired voluntarily.  
It is not easy to see how a sustained coalition could have helped in the 
negotiation process: the Group EL lost willingness to negotiate after September 2007 
and more so after December 2007 when a business-friendly government came to power. 
The negotiation outcomes of the NLU that remained under the Group EL were dismal 
and according to the members of the EGLU their relatively favorable collective 
agreement was drawn because the new management at SHT was more willing to 
compromise.29  
Diani (1997) proposes that we look at a social movements’ capacity to produce 
social capital, which is based on mutual trust and recognition among movement actors, 
as one of the outcomes. Though the weakening of the coalition may not have affected 
the immediate strike outcomes for the respective unions, if the coalition was sustained, 
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it could have positively influenced subsequent trade union politics, labour market 
policy, and cultural norms and codes of collective action of workers of different contract 
types. (Diani 1997 p135) The NLU never recovered and in 2011 left the KFCU. It could 
have provided a peace of mind to the protesters during the strike and the after. The 
second round of interviews on the union leadership in 2018 revealed that there were 
still unresolved emotional issues towards each other.30 
What extends the longevity of a coalition? In the case of the NLU and the EGLU, 
the coalition failed to foster a collective identity as otherness became more apparent in 
the protest sites as well as during the negotiations.  Though they have collectively 
engaged in a risk taking behavior – sit in strike – (Smith 2002), the decision making 
process up to it and subsequent discordance of coordination afterwards seem to have 
weakened the collective identity.  A more heartfelt communication within each 
organization as well as across the two unions could have helped the relationship. 
Recognition of each other’s positive role in the movement and accepting that one was 
doing one’s best would have provided peace of mind.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Building a coalition against a common unrelenting firm not only enabled the EGLU 
and NLU to exert greater pressure but also helped to draw more financial and political 
support. The political opportunities, memberships, and resources of the two parties 
were complementary at the beginning of the collective strike. Though as negotiation 
began, benefits of maintaining a coalition lessened, the otherness that became more 
apparent with the varying negotiation progression and collective activities hampered a 
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collective identity from forming and weakened the coalition. The NLU members 
realized that being involved in the coalition as well as the temporary workers’ 
movement as a symbol of solidarity was not helping the progression of its negotiations. 
Broader social alliance around temporary work alienated the NLU members and goals, 
and the lack of recognition of its contributions withdrew them further. For the EGLU 
members, the seeming lack of commitment of the NLU to the strikes as well as to the 
coalition led it to consider the NLU as unreliable.  
The temporary and permanent labour in South Korea has often failed to 
cooperate with one another. Permanent workers have been often quoted as saying that 
they consider the temporary workers as buffers of their job security.  The upgrade of 
temporary workers has resulted in tension between the temporaries and the 
permanents because it was framed such that the benefits will be shared with those 
who are not as qualified. From that light, the collaborative work of the EGLU and the 
NLU, though it was not able to sustain itself, was a valiant attempt to bridge the 
divide.  
This is a vast area that could be subject to future research.  An empirical 
research on unions in terms of their coalition patterns regarding the structural as well 
as organizational factors could be performed to test the conclusions drawn. From the 
trade union’s perspective, building mutual trust and recognition between workers and 
unions representing different employment types is also a topic that should be 
investigated further. 
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Table 1. NLU Demand and Management Response (by when?? DATE??) 
 
NLU Demand Management Response 
elimination of outsourcing with respect 
to the adoption of the PDA system (not 
in EGLU’s demands) 
Elimination of outsourcing after ten 
months  
Re-installment of regular workers who 
were involuntarily transferred to a 
different branch the previous year (not 
in EGLU’s demands) 
Re-installment of involuntarily 
transferred regular workers after 
individual consultation with 
administrators  
Employment guarantee for irregular 
workers of three months or more 
Employment guarantee for one more 
contractual term for irregular workers of 
three months or more 
Rehiring all the workers that were fired 
or faced contract lapse after January 
2007 and guarantee their employment 
Rehiring of the workers that were laid 
off for one more term and “try” to 
employ them continuously 
Withdrawal of all charges initiated by 
the firm to the union members from sit-
in protests 
withdrawal of all charges for the workers 
but not of the union leadership. 
 
 
Table 2. EGLU Demand and Management Response 
 
EGLU Demand Management 
  
30 
Re-employment of workers that have 
been fired from January 2007 
Re-employment of fired workers for 
another contractual period 
Upgrading the irregular contract to 
regular ones for workers of 18 months 
or more  
Employment guarantee of workers of 18 
months or more but with a different pay 
schedule than the regular workers 
Employment guarantee of irregular 
workers of three months and more 
One more contractual period for workers 
of three months and more 
Withdraw all charges against the union 
members initiated by the firm from sit-in 
protests 
Withdrawal of all charges of the workers 
but not of the union leadership 
 
 
Table 3. Number of articles that mention “forced transfers” 
 Month in 2007 Month in 2008 Total
  6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No 45 893 272 152 92 99 81 41 30 107 49 108 47 86 59 2161
Yes 3 14 6 5 2 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 44
Total 48 907 278 157 94 100 84 43 30 107 49 108 47 90 63 2205
% 6.3  1.5  2.2  3.2  2.1  1.0 3.6 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 4.4 6.3 2.0 
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Picture 1 
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Picture 2. Mention of KGW (leader of the EGLU) and PYS (leader of the NLU) 
in the newspaper articles 
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Endnotes: 
1 There is no consensus in drawing the boundary of irregular work: depending on the definition used, 
the percentage of irregular workers in South Korea in 2005 ranged from 29.1% to 47%. I use the 
definition that is consistent with the OECD definition of irregular employees which results in the figure 
29.1%: “workers under fixed-term contracts, those who do not expect their jobs to last for involuntary 
and non-economic reasons, temporary agency workers, and on-call workers.” (Grubb, Lee, and 
Tergeist 2007: 16-17) Controlling for job characteristics, the estimated wage gap between regular and 
irregular workers can range from 5% (Nam et al., 2005) to 19% (Ahn, 2004). I use the term temporary 
and irregular workers interchangeably in this article.  
2 The number of irregular workers increased from 17% in 2001 to 29% in 2005 of the total 
employment, which was the second highest rate in all OECD countries (Grubb, Lee, and Tergeist 2007: 
16). 
3 Speech of Shim Sang Jung (23 July 2007) from tape 085  
4 Interview with Ho Jin Kim (10 October 2018) 
5 Interview with Gyung Wook Kim (23 June 2018) 
6 Interview with Nam Shin Lee (3 October 2018) 
7 Interview with Kyong Ok Lee 26 July 2018) and Nam Shin Lee (3 October 2018) 
8 Interview with Ho Jin Kim (10 October 2018) and  
9 Interviews with Yoon Gak Jung (3 June 2008) and Chun Ho Lee (5 June 2008) 
10 EGLU group interview (30 May 2007) 
11 Interview with Kim Seok Won (12 September 2018) and Gyung Wook Kim (6 June 2018) 
12 Interview with Ho Jin Kim (29 May 2007) 
13 Interview with Chun Ho Lee (5 June 2008) 
14 Speech of Shim Sang Jung (23 July 2007) from tape 085  
15 EGLU group interview (30 May 2007) 
16 NLU group interview (XX June 2007) 
17 Interview with Kyong Ok Lee (26 July 2018) and Koo Eun Hoe (15 July 2008) 
Jung Kyung Seop (5 June 2008) 
18 interview Kim Ho Jin 2008, Kim Seok Won, Jung YoonKak Hur YooGyung Lee 
ChunHo  
19 Interview with Ho Jin Kim (10 October 2018) 
20 Interview with Kwon Mi Jung (10 October 2018) 
21 Interview with Ho Jin Kim (10 October 2018) and Gyung Wook Kim (23 June 2018) 
22 Interview with Ho Jin Kim (10 October 2018) and Seok Won Kim (12 September 
2018) 
23 Interview with Chun Ho Lee (5 June 2008) 
24 Interview with Kwon Mi Jung (10 October 2018) 
25  Interview with Ho Jin Kim (10 October 2018) 
26 Interview with Mi Rae Kim (22 June 2018) 
27 Interview with Ho Jin Kim  (10 October 2018), Seok Won Kim (12 September 2018), KGW 
(23 June 2018) 
28 Interview KGW LNS KHJ KSW 
29 Interview with KGW (23 June 2018) 
30 Interview with KGW, KSW, LNS, LKO 
                                                 
